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Background: Geographic variables play an important role in the study of epidemics. The role of one such variable,
population density, in the spread of influenza is controversial. Prior studies have tested for such a role using
arbitrary thresholds for population density above or below which places are hypothesized to have higher or lower
mortality. The results of such studies are mixed. The objective of this study is to estimate, rather than assume, a
threshold level of population density that separates low-density regions from high-density regions on the basis of
population loss during an influenza pandemic. We study the case of the influenza pandemic of 1918–19 in India,
where over 15 million people died in the short span of less than one year.
Methods: Using data from six censuses for 199 districts of India (n=1194), the country with the largest number of
deaths from the influenza of 1918–19, we use a sample-splitting method embedded within a population growth
model that explicitly quantifies population loss from the pandemic to estimate a threshold level of population
density that separates low-density districts from high-density districts.
Results: The results demonstrate a threshold level of population density of 175 people per square mile. A
concurrent finding is that districts on the low side of the threshold experienced rates of population loss (3.72%)
that were lower than districts on the high side of the threshold (4.69%).
Conclusions: This paper introduces a useful analytic tool to the health geographic literature. It illustrates an application
of the tool to demonstrate that it can be useful for pandemic awareness and preparedness efforts. Specifically, it
estimates a level of population density above which policies to socially distance, redistribute or quarantine populations
are likely to be more effective than they are for areas with population densities that lie below the threshold.
Keywords: Influenza, Population loss, Population density, Thresholds, Spatial distribution, Population growthBackground
Studying influenza pandemics of the past may offer valu-
able lessons for preparedness for the next great pan-
demic [1,2]. In this paper, we analyze the 1918 influenza
pandemic, during which up to 100 million people world-
wide and 670,000 people in the U.S.A. are estimated to
have died [3-6]. India, where over 15 million perished in
the short span of one year, was the single worst-affected
country in terms of total mortality [7,8]. Factors affecting
mortality from the pandemic included a lack of immun-
ity to the virus, which resulted in the infection of
higher-than-normal numbers of people, its highly conta-
gious nature [9], and the prior presence of other* Correspondence: chandr45@msu.edu
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reproduction in any medium, provided the orinfections such as tuberculosis or subsequent develop-
ment of pneumonia as the result of infection [10,11]. Be-
cause influenza viruses spread through human contact,
geography and population density in particular are po-
tential factors for transmission and, indirectly, human
mortality. The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of
population density in the influenza pandemic of 1918.
Because the statistics on influenza mortality for India
are deeply flawed, following Davis [8], we estimate popu-
lation growth trajectories allowing for a break between
1918 and 1919 to capture population loss from the dis-
ease, and use a threshold estimation method to test
whether low population density districts in India
experienced rates of population loss that were different
from high density districts.l Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly cited.
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The 1918–19 influenza pandemic was one of the worst
epidemics in history with an estimated global mortality
between 20 and 100 million [9,12]. The pandemic oc-
curred in two or three waves [13,14]. The first was a
mild wave in the spring of 1918, followed by a second
more severe wave in the following autumn that was re-
sponsible for the majority of deaths. The third wave was
sporadic [15]. The influenza pandemic of 1918–19 in
India shared many characteristics with the pandemic in
other parts of Asia and the world. In this account, we
draw heavily on the Report of the Sanitary Commis-
sioner of India for 1918 [16] and Chandra [17]. The
virus is believed to have entered India in the early
months of 1918 through the port of Bombay on the west
coast. This first wave was relatively mild. The same early
and mild first wave was observed in other countries in-
cluding Indonesia [18], England, Scotland, and Wales
[19], Portugal and Spain [20], Mexico [21], and Peru
[22], and cities including New York City [23] and Co-
penhagen [24]. It subsided by August, only to be
followed by a second and far more virulent wave that
peaked between September and November 1918 in vari-
ous parts of India. Indonesia [17], England, Scotland and
Wales [19], Portugal and Spain [20] and Mexico [21]
experienced a similar pattern of timing and relative se-
verity. Populations that were exposed to the virus early
have been shown to have benefited from acquired im-
munity against the deadly second wave in Denmark [24],
Norway [25], and Britain [26,27]. A distinctive character-
istic of this epidemic was its disproportionate impact on
victims aged between 15 and 35 years [6,14,15,28-30].
This phenomenon was also observed in India [16].Epidemics and urban responses in history
It is no coincidence that the public health community
worries about new and virulent infectious diseases [31].
As recently as 2009, an episode of pandemic influenza is
estimated to have claimed between 151,700 and 575,500
lives worldwide [32]. While vaccinations are frequently
the first line of defense against influenza viruses, devel-
opment of vaccinations for a new strain of virus may
take months. In such a situation, only short-term
measures including social distancing, and in extreme
cases evacuations and quarantines, can protect citizens
from a severe epidemic outbreak. The early introduction
of social distancing measures, such as school and church
closures and banning of mass gatherings, significantly
reduced excess mortality during the 1918–19 influenza
pandemic [33]. With similar contagious diseases, such as
SARS, plague and cholera, quarantines and evacuations
have been used to counter severe outbreaks. In the 15th
century, for example, the government of Venicecombated outbreaks of plague by establishing the
“Lazzaretto Vecchio” on a small island off the coast of
the Piazza San Marco [34]. More recently, in the late
19th and early 20th centuries, New York City quarantined
travelers on Swinburne and Hoffman islands to prevent
the spread of cholera [35]. At about the same time, the
city established the Metropolitan Board of Health to de-
velop zoning codes to prevent overcrowding in the city
and to establish standards for sanitary conditions [36].
With reference to the influenza pandemic of 1918-19 in
India, the Sanitary Commissioner of India wrote: “As the
striking distance of the influenza virus is probably short
the obvious ideal is free ventilation and isolation of
sufferers with a view to increase the air space between
infected and uninfected” [16, p.66].
Over the past two decades, sudden virus outbreaks
that could have led to widespread human pandemics,
including H1N1 [37], SARS [38], and H5N1 [39]
prompted a series of studies on non-pharmaceutical
interventions [40-48], including measures to increase
social distance, such as the creation of spatial barriers
through quarantine [49,50], relocating populations to
‘safe’ areas [51,52], or imposing travel restrictions [53].
Evacuations, a last resort among social distancing
measures, are still used; in the aftermath of the Haiti
hurricane of November, 2009, and the subsequent
earthquake of January 12, 2010, the government
ordered the evacuation of the capital, Port-au-Prince, to
prevent the spread of epidemic cholera [54]. In sum, it
is widely believed that public health interventions, in-
cluding social distancing measures and the controlled
movement of people to either sequester those infected
or as a means to lower population density below some
critical threshold can significantly decrease the likeli-
hood of a contagious disease spreading. Yet, to date,
there is little if any guidance as to what such a popula-
tion density threshold might be for any disease. Using
the influenza pandemic of 1918 as a case, this paper
presents an approach to identifying such a threshold
value as a guideline for public health policy.Population density as a factor in influenza population loss
Studies examining the potential relationship between po-
pulation density and mortality during the 1918 influenza
pandemic have produced mixed results. Garrett [55]
found a positive relationship between mortality rates and
population densities measured on a state-wide scale in
the USA. Once cities were introduced into the equation,
normalizing the mortality rate of the cities with those of
the states also showed a positive relationship with popu-
lation density. For Nigeria, crowding contributed to
comparatively higher mortality than less-crowded areas,
and “there is enough evidence to support the view that
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villages” [56]. During the 2009–10 influenza pandemic,
it was observed that H1N1 infections were sustained
over longer periods of time in Taiwanese areas with
higher population densities [57]. Theoretical models for
influenza and other transmissible respiratory diseases
consisting of agent, host, and environment interactions
usually require a high host density [58].
Chowell et al. [13] also identified a link between popu-
lation density and mortality for the 1918 pandemic,
though it is the opposite of Garrett’s [55] findings; in
Wales and England, low population density in rural
areas was positively associated with mortality. On a lar-
ger county scale, however, they found no connection
between population density or residential crowding and
mortality or transmissibility. Supporting this stream of
research, Mills et al. [59] as well as Nishiura and
Chowell [60] could not identify an association between
mortality and population size or density, measured as
household size. While a review of the literature suggests
that the evidence linking higher population densities
with higher mortality rates is mixed, intrinsically this re-
lationship makes sense, because influenza viruses spread
via human interactions [9]. With rapidly rising popula-
tion densities around the world, the creation of mega
cities, and growing international connectivity, there is,
therefore, a dire need for more research on this
phenomenon. Given its high population density and
rapid urbanization, India is of particular interest for the
study of the emergence and spread of viruses posing sig-
nificant pandemic threats [61,62].
Despite the interest in the link between population
density and influenza morbidity and mortality, little is
known about critical turning points or population dens-
ity thresholds above which the demographic cost of the
pandemic may have exceeded that of low-population
density areas. Previous studies on the 1918 pandemic
have emphasized the size of populations, be they in
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305 administrative un
62 countiesthresholds on the basis of jurisdictional sizes or
reporting boundaries. In some instances the choice of
threshold appears to have been made on the basis of
convenience (i.e., using categories that may have been
originally created by the producers of the data using
some criterion other than epidemiology (see Table 1)).
Therefore, there is a hitherto unfulfilled need for a delib-
erate exercise to determine thresholds that focus on the
epidemiologic phenomenon at hand. The aim of this
paper is to apply a threshold estimation method to iden-
tify a population density threshold separating high-
density districts in British India from low-density
districts. In estimating this threshold, we simultaneously
test the hypothesis that the low-density districts so iden-
tified differed from high-density districts in terms of
population loss. As the world becomes increasingly
urbanized, knowledge of how to estimate critical levels
of population density above which populations may be
at graver risk of contracting or succumbing to influenza
than populations in lower density areas can play an im-
portant role in fostering pandemic preparedness. The
findings of our study contribute directly to the field of
spatial epidemiology, which is concerned with “the study
of spatial variation in disease risk or incidence” to assist
public health decision making [63, p.328; 64].Results and discussion
Estimates from the initial set of models, described below,
indicated multiple possible thresholds for population
density. The point estimate of the threshold in model
(1), described in the methods section below, was 19,067
PPSM (people per square mile), for which only one dis-
trict, Calcutta, lay above the threshold (see the table in
the Appendix). The results from this model suggest that
Calcutta, the most densely populated district in British
India, with a population density of 35,025 PPSM, is an
outlier. Therefore, Calcutta was removed from the
dataset and the subsequent analyses were conductedresholds
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Table 2 Threshold models for influenza population loss
Coefficient estimate Model specification: District-specific intercepts and growth rates
Threshold point estimate Alternate threshold
Time trend (β10) † †
Flu dummy (β20) −0.2965*** −0.3144***
(0.0126) (0.0172)
Low density * flu dummy (β30) 0.0694*** 0.0596***
(0.0246) (0.0221)
Time trend * flu dummy (β40) † †
Number of obs. 1188 1188
R2 0.9964 0.9964
KEY DEMOGRAPHIC PHENOMENA
Threshold population density 175 435
Range of possible thresholds (5% level of significance) 148–209 381–464
Number (percentage) of districts outside threshold range 110 (56%)
Population loss as % of population, low density districts −3.72% −3.51%
Population loss as % of population, high density districts −4.69% −5.85%
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
†Multiple estimates, one corresponding to each district.
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The results for datasets containing the Calcutta outlier
in the Appendix are broadly consistent with the results
presented in the paper.
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates for the
models without the Calcutta outlier. These models
indicated the presence of two discrete intervals of pos-
sible threshold values. Therefore, we present two models
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Figure 1 Threshold test statistic: district-specific intercepts and growtof population density that minimized the threshold test
statistic in each interval (Figure 1). Figure 1 and Column
1 in Table 2 shows the results of the threshold estima-
tion procedure from model (1). The point estimate of
the threshold value of population density was 175 PPSM.
At the 5% level of significance, a discontinuous set of
threshold values that could not be rejected was obtained,
corresponding to the intervals 148–209 and 381–464
PPSM (see Figure 1). These ranges are analogous to a3,000 30,000
 Density (Log Scale)
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estimates, presented in Column 2 in Table 2, represent
values of the threshold that (a) cannot be rejected at the
5% level of significance and (b) yield the minimum
threshold test statistic over the alternate range of con-
tiguous possible (in the sense that they cannot be
rejected) threshold values within which they occur. In
this case, the point estimate is 435 PPSM, which
produced the lowest test statistic for the 381–464 PPSM
interval (see Figure 1).
An important characteristic of the threshold estima-
tion procedure is the ability to simultaneously test for
differences in population loss between below-threshold
and above-threshold districts. Interestingly, the diffe-
rence between low-density and high-density districts is
large. For the 175 PPSM threshold, below-threshold
districts experienced a population growth rate of −3.72%
between 1918 and 1919, while above-threshold districts
experienced a growth rate of −4.69%, for a net difference
of 0.97%. This difference is, moreover, statistically sig-
nificant, as denoted by the significance of the parameter
estimate for β30. For the 435 PPSM threshold, the
corresponding figures are −3.51%, −5.85%, and 2.31%
respectively.
In the above models, district-specific intercepts and
coefficients on the time trend were also estimated. The
intercepts correspond to the logarithm of district-specific
population in 1891 and the coefficients on the time trend
correspond to the annual rate of population growth.Figure 2 Population density threshold in India, 1918–1919.Because of the large number of estimates (198 each), these
are not reported in Table 2.
Figures 2 and 3 are a spatial illustration of the rela-
tionship between population density and influenza-
attributable population loss. Figure 2 is a map of India
that contrasts the districts that are above and below the
estimated population density threshold. Figure 3 is a
map of the districts arranged by quintile of population
loss using estimates computed in Chandra et al. [7]. In
general, the coastal areas and Gangetic plain of India
show coinciding areas of above-threshold population
density and high rates of population loss.Conclusions
The results of this study suggest the presence of popula-
tion density thresholds that can be used to separate low
population loss districts from high population loss
districts in British India during the influenza pandemic of
1918. Using Hansen’s [67] method of threshold estimation,
we identified a threshold of 175 PPSM. Below this thresh-
old, districts experienced a decline in population of 3.72%,
compared with a 4.69% decline for districts above the
threshold, indicating a role for population density in
understanding population loss from the epidemic. This
evidence is significant in light of the often mixed findings
of scholars on the relationship between population density
and influenza mortality. The results from the other
models presented in this paper suggest even greater
Figure 3 Population change in India, 1918–1919.
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density districts, so the chosen point estimates and
corresponding difference in this paper should be
considered conservative estimates.
Limitations
While this study advances the literature in a number of
ways, it has a number of limitations. The data do not
contain information about cases of influenza or mortal-
ity that resulted directly from influenza. Therefore, the
types of available data preclude analysis of case-
mortality, transmission (with or without mortality), and
certain other phenomena of epidemiologic significance.
It is also not possible to ascribe the entire population
loss from the influenza pandemic to mortality alone be-
cause of likely depressing effects of the disease on fer-
tility in the immediate aftermath of the pandemic. Even
though many studies on the 1918–1919 influenza in
New Zealand, the USA and European countries have
attempted to factor fertility into either post-pandemic
growth rates or depression of conception during the
pandemic [68-72], in the context of India, Davis [8]
estimated underreporting of births [73] by as much as
50% of the true figures. While likely minimal, migration
effects also cannot be accounted for due to the lack of
appropriate data. In light of these limitations, we have
followed the approach of Davis [8], using changes in
population size between 1918 and 1919 that are notexplained by the normal population growth trajectory,
obtained from relatively accurate population census
data, to create a picture of severity of the pandemic in
the different districts of India. This paper takes the
position that the estimated population loss is an indi-
cator of the severity of the pandemic as a whole, be
that loss the direct result of influenza or of other
conditions resulting from influenza, including pneu-
monia, decreased fertility as a consequence of influ-
enza or starvation due to pandemic-influenced famine.
The data also do not contain information about
socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty, social class or in-
come, or ethnicity) [5,25,55,74,75] or remoteness [76],
precluding the inclusion of other potential threshold
variables that have been shown to be associated with
mortality outcomes in other contexts.
The last data limitation described above also raises the
issue of the constraints that the methodology places on
the analysis. Thresholds may have temporal and spatial
variability depending on the above variables and popula-
tion structure, viral virulence, or transmissibility, though
there appears to be little by way of theory or evidence on
this subject. In addition, the threshold estimation method
used, which has been developed relatively recently, is
designed to detect a single threshold based on a single
threshold variable (in this case, population density). A
more versatile version of the method which allows for
multiple thresholds estimated by simultaneously using
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nally, to the extent that the conditions in British India were
different from conditions encountered in many developed
and developing countries today, the results need to be
interpreted in their specific context.Strengths
The above limitations do not detract conceptually from
the utility of the sample-splitting methodology for the
identification of demographic or other thresholds for
health and potentially other phenomena, and for its value
in establishing the critical role for population density in
separating high-loss districts from districts that did not
suffer as much during the single-worst epidemic of the
20th century in the single-worst-affected country. In this
light, this study may be viewed as a prototype on which
health geographers can build using the more sophisticated
data that are available in modern contexts and as the
sample-splitting methodology evolves. In addition, the
data used in this study cover a larger area and population
than any other single-country study of the pandemic, and
thus have the strength of a large sample size.
More generally, the findings presented above have a
number of implications for researchers and policy makers
in demography, epidemiology, planning, and public health.
Most importantly, they introduce a new analytic method,
threshold estimation, to the study of epidemics and their
effects on populations and population growth. Subject to
possible caveats about data and methodology, they also
demonstrate that low population density districts in Brit-
ish India may not have suffered as much as high popula-
tion density districts from the influenza pandemic of
1918–19. At a broader level, the mixed nature of results of
studies of this question and their possible connection to
contextual factors is an interesting one, and merits further
study. The results of this study suggest that plans for pan-
demic preparedness and adaptation can be informed by
the results of studies using this method, especially where
high-quality data are available. Threshold estimates can be
used to inform the public about location-based risk in
times of such epidemics where such risk is found to be
present. In addition to introducing a new analytic tool to
the study of the geography of health, therefore, it is hoped
that this study will be used as a template to inform
guidelines for pandemic preparedness issued by public
health agencies with a view to minimizing the impact of
such events in the future.Methods
Data sources
Following earlier studies that used census data [7,17,77],
the data used in this study were obtained from six
decennial censuses held in India, for the years 1891,1901, 1911, 1921, 1931, and 1941 [78]. We focus on
these censuses, and not the two censuses preceding
1891, those of 1872 and 1881, on the basis of Davis’ [8]
diagnosis that the earlier censuses undercounted the
population by over 1%. In addition, these two earlier
censuses were conducted using methods that had signifi-
cantly changed by 1891.
Within these data, we focus on population figures for
the districts that were directly ruled by the British India
government. We do not use parallel data from the
princely states of India, which were nominally under the
control of local princes and kings. Data collection by
administrative authorities was in some cases significantly
different from the British India administration in cap-
acity and function. The coverage of the dataset is broad,
encompassing 199 districts for each of the censuses for a
total sample size of 1,194 observations. In addition, to
ensure comparability over time, in the 1941 census, the
population statistics for each census were reported after
having been adjusted to conform to the district boundar-
ies as of the 1941 census [78], providing a convenient
dataset on population that is comparable across all the
censuses. The district areas used in the computation of
population density are, therefore, based on the 1941
boundaries.Methods
In order to estimate population density thresholds that
separate low- and high-density districts on the basis of
population loss from the pandemic, we use the threshold
estimation technique of Hansen [67] embedded in a
population growth model as follows. First, we compute
the mean population density of each district across the six
censuses as the population of the district divided by the
area of the district in square miles to yield persons per
square mile (henceforth PPSM). This mean population
density provides an estimate of population density at the
onset of the pandemic, and is used as the ordering vari-
able for the threshold estimation procedure. It is also
highly correlated (r = 0.999) with an alternate estimate of
population density computed using the estimate of popu-
lation in 1918 computed from the standard exponential
population growth model allowing for a break in 1918-19
[7]. After ascertaining that the correlation between this
mean population density and the dependent variable in
the population growth model, namely the log of popula-
tion, is not significantly different from zero (r = 0.036,
P = 0.219), a condition for the threshold estimation pro-
cedure, we estimate the population density threshold. The
use of the mean density rather than census-specific density
ensures that, during the implementation of the sample-
splitting algorithm (see below), all six observations for
each district lie on the same side of the threshold.
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model allowing for each district to have different inter-
cept and time trend terms to absorb heterogeneity in
(the log of ) population size and population growth, and
allowing for a drop in the population between 1918 and
1919, the year of the pandemic. This broad approach
was also employed in Davis’ [8] classic study and
developed elsewhere [7,17,77]. The general model,
which follows the approach of the latter three studies,
can be expressed as
LPOPit ¼ β0i þ β1iTt þ β2FLUt þ β3iTtFLUt þ εit
where LPOPit is the log of population in district i in year
t,Tt is a time trend, FLUt is a year-specific indicator vari-
able defined as
FLUt ¼ 1; t < 19180; t ≥ 1918

εit is a random error term, β0i, β1i, and β3i, are
vectors of district-specific parameters, and β2 is a
(fixed) parameter. To this model, for each of the
199 possible values of the threshold level of popula-
tion density (corresponding to the 199 different
districts in the sample), an indicator variable wasMod
Threshold p
Time trend (β10)
Flu dummy (β20) −0.76
(0.1
Low density * flu dummy (β30) 0.48
(0.1
Time trend * flu dummy (β40)
Number of obs. 11
R2 0.9
Threshold population density 19
Range of possible thresholds (5% level of significance) 1138-
Number (percentage) of districts outside threshold range
Population loss as % of population, low density districts −4.
Population loss as % of population, high density districts −21
Standard errors in parentheses.
*** p < 0.01.
†Multiple estimates, one corresponding to each district.
Appendix
The Table 3 shows the threshold models for influenza po
Table 3 Threshold models for influenza population loss withadded to the data such that the variable took on the
value 1 if the observation was drawn from a district
with a population density lower than the threshold
and 0 otherwise. This indicator variable was
interacted with the variable of interest, namely the
term capturing the drop in population from the in-
fluenza pandemic to produce model (1):
LPOPit ¼ β0i þ β1iTt þ β2FLUt þ β3IDFLUt
þ β4iTtFLUt þ εit ð1Þ
Here, ID is the indicator variable corresponding to the
threshold population density D [67]. For each of the 199
possible values of D, the above equation was estimated
using the 1,194 available observations. The point esti-
mate of the threshold value of D was the one for which
the sum of squared errors for the above model was
minimized. As a robustness check of the above model,
we also estimated models without district-level hetero-
geneity in the coefficient estimates corresponding to
population growth. Thus model (2) was
LPOPit ¼ β0i þ β1Tt þ β2FLUt þ β3IDFLUt
þ β4TtFLUt þ εit
ð2Þel specification: District-specific intercepts and growth rates















pulation loss with Calcutta outlier.
Calcutta outlier
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